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Summary  Existing  evidence  suggests  that  communication  failures  are  common
in  the  operating  room,  and  that  they  lead  to  increased  complications,  including
infections.  Use  of  a  surgical  safety  checklist  may  prevent  communication  failures
and  reduce  complications.  Initial  data  from  the  World  Health  Organization  Surgical
Safety  Checklist  (WHO  SSC)  demonstrated  signiﬁcant  reductions  in  both  morbidity
and  mortality  with  checklist  implementation.  A  growing  body  of  literature  points  out
that  while  the  physical  act  of  ‘‘checking  the  box’’  may  not  necessarily  prevent  all
adverse  events,  the  checklist  is  a  scaffold  on  which  attitudes  toward  teamwork  and
communication  can  be  encouraged  and  improved.  Recent  evidence  reinforces  the
fact  the  compliance  with  the  checklist  is  critical  for  the  effects  on  patient  safety  to
be  realized.
© 2015  King  Saud  Bin  Abdulaziz  University  for  Health  Sciences.  Published  by  Elsevier
Limited.  All  rights  reserved.ontents
The  Surgical  Safety  Checklist  ...............................................................................  220
Communication  lapses  are  common  ......................
The  checklist  can  improve  communication  and  teamwork
Is  it  the  checklist  or  the  teamwork?......................
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 206 616 9836.
E-mail address: patch@uw.edu (E. Patchen Dellinger).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jiph.2015.01.001
876-0341/© 2015 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Scie...................................................  220
...................................................  221
................................................... 222
nces. Published by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
220  A.E.  Pugel  et  al.
Case  study  ..................................................................................................  223
Conclusion  ..................................................................................................  223
Conﬂict  of  interest..........................................................................................  223
Ethical  approval  ............................................................................................  223
Acknowledgments.........................................................................................  223
References  ................................................................................................  223
w
b
R
f
a
p
s
c
c
t
w
t
t
i
W
t
ﬁ
u
a
i
s
o
w
S
i
C
S
c
t
h
E
b
u
a
n
p
p
iThe Surgical Safety Checklist
In 2009,  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  pub-
lished the  Surgical  Safety  Checklist  (SSC)  as  part
of their  Safe  Surgery  Saves  Lives  campaign.  The
checklist  was  adapted  from  the  ﬁeld  of  aviation,
where checklist  use  is  standard  practice.  In  avia-
tion, checklists  were  developed  in  response  to  a
crash involving  an  experienced  pilot  operating  a
new airplane  with  features  that  were  signiﬁcantly
different from  previous  models.  Shortly  after  take-
off, the  plane  stalled  and  crashed.  An  investigation
revealed that  the  pilot  had  forgotten  to  perform
one of  the  steps  necessary  for  takeoff.  In  response,
the checklist  was  created  to  prevent  future  avoid-
able disasters  [1].
With  more  than  200  million  operations  per-
formed annually,  the  WHO  recognized  the  impor-
tance  of  addressing  surgical  safety  when  the
checklist was  introduced.  The  purpose  of  the
checklist was  to  help  operating  room  (OR)  teams
remember  important  details  that  may  be  missed
during  an  operation.  In  addition,  it  served  as  a  tool
to encourage  teamwork  and  communication  [2]. In
a sense,  the  WHO  came  to  the  same  conclusion
that the  plane  crash  investigation  team  had:  even
highly skilled  OR  teams  need  tools  to  help  them
achieve optimal  results.  The  initial  WHO  SSC  was
piloted  at  eight  diverse  hospitals  around  the  world
and contained  19  items  that  were  to  be  addressed
at deﬁned  time  points  during  the  operation  (Fig.  1)
[3].  The  items  included  in  the  SSC  are  aimed  at
preventing  uncommon  but  serious  errors  by  remin-
ding the  team  to  conﬁrm  patient  identity,  surgical
site, and  other  important  characteristics  such  as
comorbid  conditions  or  anticipated  complications.
Results from  the  initial  prospective,  sequential,
time-series observational  study  showed  signiﬁcant
reductions  in  complications,  in-hospital  mortality,
rates of  unplanned  reoperation,  and  surgical  site
infection  (SSI)  compared  to  pre-checklist  rates  [4].
Since then,  the  WHO  SSC  has  been  implemented
in more  than  4000  hospitals  worldwide  [5]. Hospi-
tals are  encouraged  to  customize  the  checklist  to
their needs,  but  the  general  format  remains  the
same. Studies  validating  these  various  checklists
have continued  to  show,  for  the  most  part,  a beneﬁt
b
s
a
ahen  the  SSC  or  similar  checklist  is  used  [6—11],
ut the  mechanism  by  which  this  occurs  is  unclear.
ecent  high-proﬁle  reports  have  highlighted  the  pit-
alls of  SSCs,  such  as  inconsistent  implementation
nd compliance  [12]. In  an  era  of  increasing  com-
lexity of  care,  it  appears  that  the  checklist  is
erving  as  a  conduit  for  improved  teamwork  and
ommunication  through  which  the  improved  out-
omes result.
The aim  of  this  paper  is  to  review  the  litera-
ure related  to  SSC  use  as  a  communication  tool,
ith a focus  on  how  the  checklist  is  associated  with
eam behaviors  and  attitudes  in  the  OR.  In  addi-
ion, we  describe  scenarios  where  use  of  the  SSC
s associated  with  changes  in  patient  outcomes.
e reviewed  studies  that  have  been  collated  by
he senior  author,  who  has  extensively  studied  the
elds of  OR  safety,  communication  and  checklist
se for  the  past  10  years.  We  included  studies  that
ddressed  the  use  of  the  checklist  as  a tool  for
mproved communication  in the  OR,  with  an  empha-
is on  changes  in  both  team  behaviors  and  clinical
utcomes  after  implementation.  Additional  studies
ere selected  that  described  compliance  with  the
SC and  how  it  may  be  affected  by  variations  in
mplementation strategy.
ommunication lapses are common
afety  within  the  OR  is  an  important  public  health
oncern.  It  is  estimated  that  of  the  complications
hat occur  within  the  hospital  setting,  more  than
alf are  associated  with  surgical  procedures  [13].
very operation  has  a  series  of  steps  that  must
e performed  correctly  every  time:  surgeons  must
se the  correct  equipment,  the  equipment  must  be
vailable and  in  proper  working  order,  and  drugs
eed to  be  administered  in  a  timely  and  appro-
riate fashion.  Errors  can  occur  at  any  step  with
otential  for  threats  to  patient  safety.  As  their  roles
n an  operation  are  interdependent,  it  is  incum-
ent on  the  anesthesia  team,  the  nursing  staff,  and
urgeons  to  communicate  effectively  to  prevent
voidable complications  such  as  wrong  site  surgery
nd inappropriate  antibiotic  administration.
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iFigure  1  Copy  of  World  Health  O
Despite  this,  research  has  shown  that  surgeons,
nesthesiologists,  and  nurses  have  rather  differ-
nt concepts  of  what  constitutes  teamwork  and
ommunication  in  the  OR  [14,15].  One  study  used
he Safety  Attitudes  Questionnaire  (SAQ)  to  assess
erception  of  patient  safety  in  the  OR.  The  SAQ
s a  standardized  survey  that  uses  a  ﬁve-point
ikert scale  to  measure  items  such  as  team-
ork and  safety  [16].  This  particular  study  found
hat women  reported  signiﬁcantly  lower  aggre-
ated scores  than  men  on  the  domain  ‘‘teamwork
limate’’ (69  vs  76,  p  < 0.05)  [17]. A  separate
tudy investigated  speciﬁc  aspects  of  teamwork
nd found  that  nurses  reported  signiﬁcantly  lower
cores  than  surgeons  regarding  reception  of  nurs-
ng input  (3.8  vs  4.3,  p  < 0.001),  ability  to  voice
oncern (3.5  vs  3.7,  p  = 0.03),  and  whether  physi-
ians and  nurses  work  well  as  a  team  (3.3  vs  3.7,
 <  0.001)  [14].  The  consequences  of  this  disparity
an be  serious.  In  one  study  investigating  reports
f wrong  site  surgery,  OR  personnel  voiced  con-
ern in  only  22%  of  cases  (p  <  0.001).  Of  these
imes, surgeons  responded  to  the  concern  69%  of
he time.  Pooled  results  predicted  that  in  cases
ith the  potential  for  wrong-site  surgery,  concerns
ould be  raised  and  addressed  only  41%  of  the  time
18].
s
O
Tization  Surgical  Safety  Checklist.
While  wrong  site  surgery  is  an  uncommon  event,
ommunication failures  are  common,  occurring
very 7—8  min  and  affecting  up  to  30%  of  interac-
ions in  the  OR  [19,20]. For  a routine  case  lasting
—3 h,  this  means  that  up  to  25  attempts  at  com-
unication  may  be  unsuccessful.  Use  of  a  checklist
ay prevent  more  than  half  of  communication  fail-
res from  occurring  [21]  by  orienting  the  team
o the  individual  patient,  alerting  each  member
o potential  complications,  and  encouraging  team
embers  to  voice  concern  when  they  notice  an
rror occurring.
he checklist can improve
ommunication and teamwork
ne  of the  primary  arguments  in  favor  of  check-
ists is  that  they  help  to  decrease  surgically
ssociated  morbidity  and  mortality,  and  can  be
mplemented  in  most  settings.  Use  of  system-
ide checklists  can  improve  compliance  with  other
etrics,  such  as  increased  timely  antibiotic  admin-
stration,  decreased  unexpected  delays  in  the
chedule,  and  reduced  time  spent  outside  of  the
R gathering  supplies  during  an  operation  [21—23].
imely antibiotic  administration  has  been  linked
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to  a  decrease  in  surgical  site  infection.  In  one
study,  pre-incision  antibiotics  were  not  adminis-
tered 12.1%  of  the  time;  after  introduction  of  a
checklist,  this  number  decreased  to  7.1%  (p  =  0.015)
[23].  While  introducing  the  checklist  can  initially  be
viewed as  disruptive,  staff  members  typically  have
a favorable  attitude  after  it  has  been  initiated  [24].
Substantial  work  has  been  undertaken  to  under-
stand if  the  use  of  checklists  actually  improves
communication  in  the  OR.  In  a  pilot  study  inves-
tigating  the  utility  of  pre-procedural  brieﬁng  in
cardiac surgery  (similar  to  the  WHO  SSC),  the  num-
ber of  miscommunication  events  declined  by  50%  in
the brieﬁng  group  compared  to  the  group  that  did
not use  the  brieﬁng  tool  [21]. Other  studies  have
found  that  communication  failures  declined  by  two
thirds after  initiation  of  a  surgical  brieﬁng  [24].  In
a study  investigating  pre-  and  post-implementation
scores using  the  SAQ,  respondents  were  more  likely
to agree  that  checklists  are  important  for  safety
(4.58 vs  4.79,  p  =  0.0058),  and  they  were  more  likely
to report  a  culture  that  encouraged  team  mem-
bers to  voice  concern  (4.02  vs  4.21,  p  =  0.0225).
Additionally, 93.4%  of  the  clinicians  who  responded
to the  survey  stated  that  if  they  were  undergoing
an operation,  they  would  want  the  checklist  used
[25].
Critics  of  the  SSC  have  noted  that  while  use  of
the checklist  may  identify  problems,  the  person
conducting the  checklist  is  ultimately  responsi-
ble for  resolving  the  problem  and  redirecting  the
team [26].  For  example,  if  the  checklist  demon-
strates that  the  patient  did  not  receive  appropriate
antibiotics in  a  timely  fashion,  the  surgeon,  anes-
thesiologist,  and  circulating  nurse  must  rectify  this
mistake prior  to  proceeding  with  the  operation.
This begins  to  address  an  important  concern:  while
the checklist  itself  might  be  improving  patient
safety, there  may  be  something  different  about
teams who  routinely  use  the  checklist.  Checklists
are rarely  comprehensive  enough  to  catch  every
possible  error.  Instead,  proper  use  of  the  check-
list may  be  a  marker  for  teamwork  and  cooperation
within the  OR.
Is it the checklist or the teamwork?
Regardless  of  checklist  use,  the  link  between
team behaviors  and  patient  safety  is  well  recog-
nized. Infrequent  use  of  team  behaviors  (deﬁned
in one  study  as  ‘‘brieﬁng,’’  ‘‘information  shar-
ing,’’ ‘‘inquiry,’’  ‘‘vigilance  and  awareness,’’
‘‘assertion,’’  and  ‘‘contingency  management’’)  is
associated with  increased  risk  of  death  and  other
t
a
1
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omplications  [27], while  high  levels  of  communi-
ation and  collaboration  are  associated  with  overall
ower rates  of  risk-adjusted  morbidity  [28]. Other
vidence  shows  a  correlation  between  increased
eamwork and  a lower  frequency  of  errors  during
n operation  [29].  Wiegmann,  in  examining  when
rrors in  the  OR  are  discovered  and  by  whom,  con-
luded  that  while  poor  teamwork  can  lead  to  errors,
ood teamwork  leads  to  the  detection  and  correc-
ion of  mistakes  [30].
Investigators  have  attempted  to  describe  the  link
etween checklist  use  and  improved  patient  out-
omes.  One  explanation  is  that  use  of  the  checklist
mproves the  safety  culture  within  an  institution  by
acilitating communication.  Makary  and  colleagues
dministered  an  OR  based  version  of  the  SAQ  to
ssess changes  after  implementation  of  an  OR  brief-
ng protocol.  They  found  that  introduction  of  an  OR
rieﬁng improved  collaboration  amongst  providers.
espondents  reported  increased  scores  on  items
uch as  awareness  of  surgical  site  brought  about  by
he brieﬁng  (3.74  vs  3.18,  p  < 0.001),  coordinated
fforts by  surgical  staff  and  anesthesia  staff  (4.54
s 3.68,  p <  0.000),  and  on  the  importance  of  the
rieﬁng  to  patient  safety  (3.24  vs  2.75,  p <  0.001)
31].
However,  checklist  implementation  may  intro-
uce  new  challenges  that  had  not  previously  been
onsidered.  In a  viewpoint  discussing  checklist
se, Rydenfalt  contends  that  merely  introducing  a
hecklist without  monitoring  compliance  may  actu-
lly make  the  OR  less  safe  because  previous  safety
hecks  are  dropped  [32]. OR  staff  have  reported
n interviews  that  use  of  the  checklist  can  inter-
upt the  performance  of  other  safety  tasks  that
re simultaneously  being  performed  by  individuals.
dditionally, without  a  ﬁrm  sense  of  commitment
o the  checklist  it may  become  a  routine  activ-
ty of  checking  off  boxes  without  actually  driving
ehavior  change  or  improvement  [33].  Running
hrough the  list  in  such  fashion  may  give  OR  staff
 false  sense  of  security  that  issues  have  truly
een resolved  when  in  fact  they  have  not  [34].
ithout  providing  team  members  proper  instruc-
ion  regarding  the  use  and  value  of  the  checklist,
t may  actually  become  a nuisance  to  the  OR  staff.
While there  is  a signiﬁcant  amount  of  data
howing that  checklist  use  leads  to  improve-
ents in  patient  outcomes,  investigators  have
lso performed  checklist  audits  to  evaluate  how
he OR  team  uses  the  SSC  in  everyday  practice.
evy and  colleagues  examined  the  efﬁcacy  of
he checklist  for  ensuring  performance  in  the  OR
nd found  that  administrative  records  conﬁrmed
00% performance  while  auditing  by  observers  in
he OR  recorded  less  than  50%  completion  for
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ourgical  safety  checklist  use  to  improve  communica
ost  elements,  and  in  some  cases  less  than  10%
f the  checklist  elements  were  completed  [35].
ubsequently,  the  same  group  organized  safety
orkshops as  well  as  a  stakeholder  engagement
roup to  customize  the  checklist  for  local  concern.
ith these  two  interventions,  overall  adherence
mproved from  30%  to  96%  (p  <  0.001)  [36].
ase study
 recent  report  raised  serious  questions  about  the
tility and  effectiveness  of  surgical  checklists.  In
010, the  Canadian  Province  of  Ontario  mandated
hat each  hospital  use  the  WHO  SSC  and  that  they
eport  their  compliance.  In  this  real-world  obser-
ational  study,  hospitals  were  evaluated  before
nd after  implementation  of  the  SSC.  Information
bout compliance  was  abstracted  from  administra-
ive records.  Change  in  surgical  mortality  was  the
rimary  outcome,  but  the  investigators  also  looked
t other  outcomes  such  as  morbidity  and  readmis-
ion. The  results  of  the  study  showed  that  despite
idespread adoption  of  the  WHO  SSC,  there  was  no
igniﬁcant  difference  in  mortality  (0.71%  vs  0.65%,
 =  0.13)  or  surgical  complications  (3.86%  vs  3.83%,
 =  0.29)  [12].
It is  unclear  why  the  results  of  the  Ontario
tudy were  so  different  from  the  original  WHO
tudy. The  ﬁndings  sparked  a  debate  about  what
he surgical  community  should  expect  from  the
SC, and  whether  its  use  was  directly  associated
ith a  change  in  outcome.  One  of the  criticisms
f the  Ontario  study  was  related  to  implementa-
ion strategy,  as  it  seemed  that  individual  hospitals
ere responsible  for  implementation  without  being
iven administrative  support.  In  the  WHO  SSC  study,
he task  of  implementation  required  considerable
esources and  support  in  order  to  be  effective.
dditionally,  there  was  concern  that  compliance
ith the  SSC  was  likely  lower  than  what  it  had  been
n previous  studies  so  the  expected  effects  were
ot realized  [37].  Despite  operational  ﬂaws,  many
ay that  the  ﬁndings  from  Ontario  should  be  seri-
usly considered,  as  the  observational  nature  of
his study  is  likely  to  be  characteristic  of  typical
se of  the  checklist  [38,39].  The  results  found  in
he rigorously  controlled  environment  of  a  random-
zed controlled  trial  do  not  always  approximate  the
ffects that  are  seen  in  ‘‘real  world’’  conditions,
hich may  explain  why  there  was  no  difference  in
orbidity or  mortality  rates  in  Ontario.  Addition-
lly, simply  telling  people  to  change  their  behavior
ithout providing  any  guidance  or  support  on  how
o do  so  may  not  be  the  most  effective  strategy.
R and  reduce  complications  223
onclusion
he  modern  surgical  environment  is  complex,
nd communication  errors  are  relatively  com-
on. As  described,  use  of  the  SSC  has  become
ommon throughout  the  world.  While  checklists
how promise  in  the  reduction  of  surgical  mor-
idity and  mortality,  there  is  also  evidence  that
hese improvements  are  not  realized  without  care-
ul attention  to  implementation  strategy.  When
eciding  to  implement  checklists  in  the  OR,  admin-
strators  should  assess  the  climate  of  their  hospital
n order  to  make  the  checklist  relevant  to  those  who
ill be  using  it rather  than  an  additional  hurdle  to
ump over.  Providing  feedback  to  teams  regarding
atient outcomes  and  OR  performance  may  be  a
aluable strategy  to  promote  buy-in  at  the  provider
evel  [33].  In  addition,  encouraging  customization
f the  checklist  to  ﬁt  the  needs  of  the  team  may
romote a feeling  of  ownership  over  the  checklist,
ncreasing compliance  along  the  way  [33,36]. With-
ut the  support  of  staff  members,  it  is  unlikely  that
he checklist  will  lead  to  any  changes  in  patient
utcomes. For  now,  the  surgical  community  should
iew the  checklist  as  a  tool  for  improving  commu-
ication and  safety  culture,  and  be  realistic  about
ts direct  impact  on  patient  safety.
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